Perceptions of Implementation: Treaty Signatory Views of Treaty Implementation by Morin, Jean-Pierre
Western University
Scholarship@Western
Aboriginal Policy Research Consortium International (APRCi)
2007
Perceptions of Implementation: Treaty Signatory
Views of Treaty Implementation
Jean-Pierre Morin
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/aprci
Part of the Other Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons
Citation of this paper:
Morin, Jean-Pierre, "Perceptions of Implementation: Treaty Signatory Views of Treaty Implementation" (2007). Aboriginal Policy
Research Consortium International (APRCi). 108.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/aprci/108
8
Perceptions of Implementation: 
Treaty Signatory Views of Treaty 
Implementation 
Jean‑Pierre Morin 
The views expressed in this communication are those of the author, and not 
necessarily those of the Government of Canada.
Introduction
Since  the  rebirth of  the  Indian Rights movement, Treaty First Nations  and  the 
Government of Canada have agreed to disagree. Both sides have radically different 




hand, counters that it has substantially implemented and fulfilled its treaty obliga-
tions. For cases in which First Nations groups have maintained that treaty terms 
remain unfulfilled, the specific claims process has been created to address their 
allegations. This disagreement on the degree of implementation of the Numbered 
Treaties is a major underlying cause of conflict between Canada and Treaty First 
Nations on Numbered Treaty issues, which, in turn, is affecting the implementa-
tion of modern initiatives, programs, and agreements—not to mention increasing 
the financial and resource costs associated with them through such delays.





that the treaty terms as described were incomplete and insufficient to help them 
cope with a changing living environment. To understand the modern Numbered 
Treaty debate, it is useful to examine the origins of the conflict—specifically, 
how the treaty signatories’ views of treaty implementation were expressed in the 
first 20 years after the treaty signings, and how these views had an impact upon 
the  relations between  the Government of Canada and First Nations peoples.  It 
was clear from the first year after the treaty signings that the Crown and Aborigi-
nal signatories did not share the same view of the treaties. While Treaty chiefs 
repeatedly called upon the Department of Indian Affairs and Ottawa to fulfill their 
— 123 — 
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promises  through  letters  and  petitions,  the  government  steadfastly  stuck  to  its 
policy of strict adherence to the terms of the text. As hardship befell the bands 





Territories,  such  an  expansive  study  is  not  practical  in  this  instance.  In  order 
to develop  a better,  representative understanding of  the  issues  at  hand  and  the 
evolution of the growing conflict between the Government of Canada and First 
Nations in the Northwest, two treaty regions will be used as a type of case study 
of the Northwest. The areas included in Treaties 4 and 6, covering what is now 
southern  and  central  Saskatchewan  as  well  as  central Alberta,  are  the  best  to 
represent the conflict because of the large volume of correspondence from bands 
in these areas to the Crown expressing their opinions regarding the implementa-
tion of  the  treaties. Furthermore,  the Department of  Indian Affairs  saw several 
of the chiefs in these two areas as “troublesome,” and kept substantial record of 
their opinions on  these particular  tribes and  their  claims. Finally, departmental 
officials also responded to the claims being made by the Treaty 4 and 6 chiefs, in 




Canada  undertook  the  negotiation  of  a  series  of  treaties  across  the Northwest 












were  only  done  after  a  considerable  number  of  requests  from  the Aboriginal 
populations of the North and South Saskatchewan rivers. After initially refusing 
to do so, the government conceded to increasing demands and appeals from the 
area’s  Aboriginal  population  and  the  Northwest  Territories  Council  and  sent 
Commissioners to negotiate Treaty 4 at Fort Qu’Appelle. Alexander Morris, the 
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the untreated areas  in  the summer of 1875,  the Dominion government decided 




the  other  commissioners managed  to  secure  a  treaty,  but  only  after  conceding 




sovereignty over  the Northwest, Aboriginal  signatories had different goals  and 
intents. It was central for  them to secure some compensation for  the inevitable 
loss of  their  land  to growing settlement, and  they needed assistance  in making 
the transition towards an agricultural lifestyle. During the negotiations for both 
Treaties 4 and 6, the chiefs called for more assistance, more food, more seed, more 
cattle,  and more  implements. The  treaties  also promised  to  avoid  any possible 
violent conflicts between the Aboriginal population and white settlers, a concern 







Initial Reaction to Treaty Terms and 
Implementation
As the officials of the Department of Indian Affairs settled into the administra-
tion of Ottawa’s policies and the fulfilment of the Crown’s treaty obligations, 
problems with the treaties were becoming apparent. At both signings, a signifi-
cant number of bands were absent. It has been estimated that, during the nego-
tiations  at Qu’Appelle  in 1874, nearly half of  the Aboriginal population either 
was  not  present  at  the  signing  or  refused  to  sign  at  that  time. These  included 
some of the most influential chiefs, such as Piapot. In his historical study of the  
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implementation of Treaty 4, Raoul McKay reports that most of the Assiniboine 








several  prominent  chiefs  were  absent  during  the  Fort  Pitt  negotiations. When 
Morris  and  the  Treaty  Commission  arrived,  some  one  hundred  lodges  were 
gathered  to meet  them. A  large  number  of  Cree  and  Saulteaux were  out  on  a 




believed  that Sweet Grass was  the principal chief of  the district and  that, with 




serious issue during the first treaty annuity payment. Two members of the original 
treaty  commission,  W.J.  Christie  and  M.G.  Dickieson,  arrived  at  Fort  Ellice 
in 1875 to find twice the number lodges that had been present a year previous. A 
council had been held prior to the arrival of the government officials, and Christie 
and Dickieson were surprised to discover that the assembled bands wanted new 
terms  for  the  treaty.  In  his  report  to David Laird, Minister  of  the  Interior  and 
Treaty  4 Commissioner, Christie warned  the  chiefs  that  a  refusal  of  the  terms 
of the 1874 treaty would result in a report to the government that the chiefs had 
“broken the agreement.” In her study of the agricultural policies of the Depart-




Dickieson did not include the demands in the official report of the adhesion and 
annuity payment. Rather, they included them in a separate letter to Laird. In their 
letter, the commissioners indicated that they explained the main premises of the 
treaty  to  the bands,  that all bands be  treated equally. They also had stressed  to 
the assembled bands  that  the original agreement should be respected. For  their 
part,  the assembled First Nations had made  three demands: more money, more 
implements,  and more assistance. The annuity  set  in Treaty 4 was  regarded as 
insufficient, and the chiefs asked for the annuity to be increased from $5 to $12 a 
person. They also requested an increase in the amount spent on ammunition and 
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twine from $750 for the entire treaty area to $250 per year per band. In regard 







up  at  the Qu’Appelle  signing  in  1874. They  followed  up  by  saying  that  these 












main  tool  for  securing Canada’s  interests  to  the  lands  of  the Northwest  at  the 
lowest possible cost (Dyck 1986, 122). Treaty commissioners and the officers of 
the Department of Indian Affairs saw the treaties as once and for all agreements 







the civilization projects of the department, and officials, politicians, and the public 
at large maintained that it was their responsibility to bring the Indian towards the 
more “civilized,” British Victorian way of  life. Furthermore,  the treaties bound 
the Treaty bands to the law of Canada, as well as binding them to fulfilling their 
half of  the  treaty promises—“yielding, ceding and surrendering”  their  interests 
and title to the land (39). But while the government had a legal system to enforce 
Aboriginal fulfilment of the treaty terms, there was no such mechanism to enforce 
a mutually acceptable interpretation of the Crown’s obligations.
As  demonstrated  by  the  1875  requests  for  renegotiation  of  the  terms  of 
Treaty 4, the fulfilment of the clauses regarding agricultural implements and 
assistance was one of  the central grievances of Treaty bands. As several histo-
rians  have  shown,  the Crown was  not willing  to  commit  fully  to  the  lifestyle 
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ring some 60,000 people  from a nomadic  to a  settled agricultural  lifestyle,  the 
department was hampered by constant financial shortfalls and budgetary restric-
tions. As McKay’s study of the implementation of Treaty 4 suggests, the terms of 
the treaties themselves did not allow for sufficient funds or rations to allow bands 
to gain a foothold in their new lives as agriculturalists (McKay 1972, 131).
The terms of the treaties were to be followed exactly and precisely. This strict 
adherence  to  the  text not only  limited  the extent of  the Crown’s  treaty obliga-
tions, but was also fiscally prudent for the government. In both Treaties 4 and 6, 




settle on  their  reserves and commence  to break up  the  land.”5 To departmental 
officials, both this clause and the similar one in Treaty 6 limited the Crown’s 





officials stated that implements were not to become the property of the bands or 
chiefs. Rather, the tools, and even the cattle, remained the property of the govern-
ment and any damage to them could be judged as vandalism of Crown property. 
Departmental officials were reluctant to replace damaged tools because of the 
cost, but also because some believed that it would serve little purpose to do so.
At  the  time  of  the  implementation  of  the  treaties,  an  economic  slowdown 
was  having  a  serious  impact  upon  the  business  of  the  Canadian  government. 
The worldwide recession, later a depression, lasted some 20 years, and severely 
reduced  the  federal  government’s  revenues, which were  based on  excise  taxes 
and  duties. At  the  same  time,  a  new  deputy  superintendent  general  of  Indian 
Affairs was taking charge, centralizing decision making and changing the admin-





He seldom took the advice of men in the field and relied almost entirely upon 
his own opinions. Vankoughnet was also renowned for his frugality and efforts 
to minimize costs; his efforts created a slow and largely inefficient administra-
tion.6 Vankoughnet’s administration made no distinction between the funds spent 
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his  1881  tour  of  the Northwest,  during which  he met with  several  chiefs  and 









and  cattle  (Carter  1990,  69). With  the  goal  of  reducing  costs,  the  department 
was  to  limit  the  distribution  of  tools  and  implements. Along  with Vankough-




While  it  is  true  to  state  that  the Department of  Indian Affairs was  spending 
far more than was required by the terms of the treaties for rations, implements, 
and cattle, these expenditures were still insufficient to permit a proper transi-
tion from hunting to farming. Reports of bands killing their cattle for food were 
frequent, as were accounts of individuals begging at the doors of white settlers. 
These incidents did not lead departmental officials to recognize problems with the 
agricultural policy or the insufficiency of the rations being issued. Instead, politi-
cians and bureaucrats saw these incidents as examples of laziness, or a refusal to 
become self-sufficient. This opinion was widespread throughout Indian Affairs. In 
a letter to Alexander Morris in 1873, Edward McKay stressed that the transition 
to an agricultural way of life would not be easy for the Plains people: “The Plains 




the dominant view of officials, and this opinion coloured all subsequent relations 
with First Nations. With the desired goal of compelling Aboriginal people to adopt 
farming, in concordance with the government’s underlying goal of civilizing the 
Treaty bands, and influenced by the Victorian belief that charity leads to laziness, 
the Department of Indian Affairs adopted a ration policy of “food for work.” The 
issuance of rations became directly tied to the work Aboriginal bands undertook, 
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“Magnificent Gifts,” Jean Friesen explains that “to the Indians, disillusioned 
with the government’s unilateral interpretation, increasingly confined in their 
economic opportunities, and ruled by  the federal Indian Act  to which  they had 















At the first treaty payment after the signing of Treaty 6 at Fort Carlton, complaints 
and concerns about the treaty culminated in the drafting of a petition that stated 





Battleford,  attributed  the  reason  for  the  petition  upon  the  late  arrival  of  treaty 
goods and provisions to Fort Carlton. He reported to G.M. Dickieson that all the 
assembled  chiefs  had  signed  the  petition  and  already  sent  it  to Ottawa.10 This 
petition  referred  to  the  treaty  of  1876  as  nothing  but  “sweet  promises”  to  the 
bands so that they would surrender their lands. In an effort to resolve the situation, 
Walker called a council of the chiefs and explained why the presents had not been 
distributed at the time of the payments. Through the influence of Mistowasis and 
Ah-kha-ta-koop,  two chiefs who had  led  the campaign  for  the adhesion of  the 
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We  the  undersigned  chiefs  of  the Cree Nation who  signed  the Treaty  that was made 
at Carlton  last  summer wish you  to express  to our Good Father,  the Governor of  this 
Country our entire, and complete content and satisfaction with the terms and conditions 
of  that  treaty;  and  to  thank our  good Mother  the Queen  in  our  own manners,  for  the 






mental official and apologized for their actions. In the early years of the treaty, 
chiefs were quick to rescind their earlier demands when confronted and asked for 











Cauchon’s  interpreter, Pasqua presented  a  series of  complaints  about  the  inad-
equacies of the treaties. Seeing the lieutenant-governor as a more direct represen-
tative of the Queen than the officials of the Department of Indian Affairs, Pasqua 
asked that Cauchon call upon the Queen to rectify the inadequacies of the treaties. 
The report stated that the chief believed that the department was not fulfilling its 
promises even though his band had cleared 30 acres of land for planting, adding 
that “they were neither supplied with cattle to break and work the land; seed to sow 









When Cauchon’s office forwarded a report to the Department of Indian Affairs, 
Laird was quick to refute Pasqua’s claims and question the value of his character. 
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While sources prior to this incident cited Pasqua as an industrious and valuable 





claim  and  returned  to  the  letter  of  the  text  of  the  treaty,  stating  that  “there  is 
no  stipulation  to  that  effect  in Treaty no.  4.”15 Because Laird  refuted Pasqua’s 








dent  general  of  Indian Affairs. The  circular  asked  that  reports  of  the  status  of 
Indian  affairs  by  agency  be  sent  to Ottawa. One  question  in  particular  related 
to the implementation of treaties: “Are the Indians satisfied with the manner in 
which the treaty are [sic] being carried out; if not, what are the grounds of their 
dissatisfaction?”16 On the whole, the agents stated that the bands in their agencies 
were largely satisfied with the implementation of the treaties and that there 
were but  a  few complaints  regarding  the quantity of  stock animals  and  imple-
ments due  to  them.17 David Laird, as the highest ranking departmental official, 
rejected any possibility of complaints: “The Indians of this superintendency [the 












As  the  Indian Affairs department was also using  these  reports as a measure of 
the agents’ management of their agencies, agents themselves appear to downplay 
the  complaints made  by  bands.  In  several  instances,  the  agents  stated  that  the 
bands were satisfied, but had a few minor complaints and proceeded to list several 
specific complaints dealing with the fulfilment of promises for stock animals and 
implements.19 Agents  replied  that  the  bands were  asking more  than  the  treaty 
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Indian Activism and Government Refusals
The reports of departmental officials are, thankfully, not the only source of infor-
mation regarding complaints of treaty non-fulfilment made by bands. Chiefs 
were quick  to use  the available resources at  their disposal  to press  the govern-
ment to look into their complaints. The letters, petitions, and delegations were so 











law signified to the assembled chiefs the importance of his status and influence. 




grievances.  Over  the  course  of  the  two  meetings,  the  governor  general  was 
addressed by numerous and influential chiefs and headmen. 









Treaty” and that a new treaty was necessary because “we cannot live by the first 
treaty: we shall die off ... They [the government] cannot hold the treaty that was 
made before.”21 The chiefs called upon the governor general to reopen the treaties 
and negotiate more generous  terms  for  the Aboriginal  signatories. Chiefs  such 
as Poundmaker, the influential Cree leader from the Battleford district, recalled 
Alexander Morris’s words at the treaty negotiations in 1876 when it was stated that 
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similar to every other meeting with government officials.
The  other  incident  that  garnered  considerable  attention  was  a  letter  to  the 









tions. As did  the  chiefs who met with  the governor general,  the  letter  referred 
to the promises made by the Treaty commissioners that the treaties would help 
the Indians survive and prosper. Since the treaty, the bands had become poverty-





Despite  the  chiefs’  warnings,  the  department  paid  little  heed  to  the  letters’ 
complaints  and accusations. Rather, Lawrence Vankoughnet,  the deputy  super-
intendent general, and Edgar Dewdney, the Indian commissioner, spent the next 
several months trying to find whom had written the letter for the chiefs. When 
Father  C.  Scollen,  a  Catholic missionary  in  the  Edmonton  district  and  a man 
highly critical of the Indian department, was finally identified, they accused him 
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of acting in a treasonous manner and of causing great harm to the bands by raising 
their  expectations and spreading  lies.25 The archival files of the Department of 
Indian Affairs  contain  a  copy of  the original  letter  printed  in  the Bulletin,  and 
some 20 pages worth of  correspondence  relating  to  the department’s  efforts  at 
identifying  Scollen,  but  not  a  single  document  disputes  or  even  addresses  the 
complaints presented in the letter.
As  letters,  petitions,  and  delegations  proved  to  be  largely  ineffectual,  other 
chiefs chose different routes in attempts to enforce the fulfilment of treaty terms. 







ticated  machinery,  all  the  while  demanding  rations  for  his  band  (Department 
of  Indian Affairs, 1882, 195). Piapot, while not present  at  the 1874  signing of 
Treaty 4, was one of the leading chiefs who demanded that the treaty be modified 
during  the  1875  treaty  payment  at  Qu’Appelle.  As  with  many  chiefs  in  the 
Treaty 4 area, Piapot wanted his  reserve  to be  in  the Cypress Hills,  a  location 
rejected by the department (Morin 2003). Told to take a reserve near Indian Head, 










Of the three chiefs, Big Bear was considered by far the most influential and 
potentially dangerous leader on the Prairie. As has already been stated, Big Bear 
had one of  the  largest  followings  among  the Plains Cree  in  the Treaty  6  area, 
and was well  respected as a wise man not only for his council but also for his 
medicine. While  starvation  forced  him  to  adhere  to  the  treaty,  Big  Bear  was 
still determined to continue to press the Department of Indian Affairs for better 
treaty terms. Refusing to take a reserve, or by asking for land that he knew would 
be rejected by officials, he travelled across the region, calling upon the other 
chiefs  to  stand  united with  him  against  the  federal  government. By  1884, Big 
Bear had considerable support from among the different bands. In his report to 
Edgar Dewdney about Big Bear calling upon the department to fulfil the treaties, 
Agent  J.A. McRae  stated  that  “a  year  ago,  [Big Bear]  stood  alone,  in making 
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ment officials, a tactic adopted by Louis O’Soup in the Treaty 4 area.28 For his 
refusal to take treaty and a reserve, as well as his constant meetings with chiefs, 
the higher-ranking officers of the department viewed Big Bear with considerable 
suspicion. Hayter Reed, one-time Indian agent and assistant Indian commissioner 
for the Northwest, described Big Bear as “an agitator and always has been and 






as nothing more than troublesome behaviour. The officials of the Department of 
Indian Affairs continued to be blind to any link between the claims and complaints 
being made and their own implementation of the treaties.
The  general  feeling  of  dissatisfaction  with  the  department’s  policies  and 
practices,  and  Big  Bear’s  efforts  to  unite  the  bands  across  the  Northwest, 




deal with the federal government’s non-fulfilment of the treaties and what tactic 
should be employed to negotiate new agreements with the Crown. Piapot and Big 





his  reserve  in  the  fall of 1883 with attendance by most of  the Treaty 4 chiefs. 
During the meetings, Piapot had little difficulty convincing the others to change 





As  messengers  travelled  between  reserves  calling  the  bands  together,  the 
Department of Indian Affairs, thinking that these councils were the prelude to a 
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notes, the chiefs’ dissatisfaction with the treaty terms was well known. Because 




A firm stand must be taken and the answer no given  to all  their demands,  for  if  they 




As  there were a  relatively small number of North West Mounted Police  in  the 





The  councils  were,  on  the  whole,  very  well  attended.  The  biggest  council 
of 1884 was hosted by Big Bear and Poundmaker, on Poundmaker’s reserve near 
Battleford. These meetings of  the chiefs proved  to be constructive and accom-
plished Big Bear’s goal of unifying the bands. The final outcome of the council 
was instruction for a delegation led by Big Bear to travel first to see Piapot in 
Treaty 4, then to Dewdney in Regina, and finally onward to Ottawa to meet with 
Vankoughnet. Their goal was to express the concerns and desires of the chiefs to 





provisions. When Craig  refused,  he was  struck  by  one  of  the men  and  subse-








and Poundmaker for having organized the council in the first place. The incident, 
however,  led  to  a  review  of  the  department’s  policy  regarding  rations  and  the 
discretionary powers of agents.
With a growing number of incidents between departmental officials and Indians 
occurring  across  the  Northwest,  Dewdney,  Hayter  Reed,  and  Deputy  Super-
intendent General Lawrence Vankoughnet began to focus  their attention on the 
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influence of specific chiefs as being at the root of the problems. Reed, the assistant 
Indian  commissioner, was  an  ever-increasing  presence  in  Indian Affairs. After 
Dewdney’s assumption of the role of lieutenant governor of the Northwest Terri-
tories, Reed took on an ever-growing amount of responsibility. As he personally 











chiefs to show how the treaties had not been fulfilled and explained away the basis 
of every complaint with examples of the Crown’s fulfilment of its obligations. 
Reed reported that Big Bear’s involvement in the petition was further proof of his 





bands that the treaties were being fulfilled and that the federal government was 
giving them far more than what was stated in the treaties.
As they were seen as the most disruptive influences to the proper administration 









imprisonment  of  chiefs  for  “disloyalty”  and  stirring  up  discontent,  the magis-
trates  and  the North West Mounted Police  only  arrested  and  convicted  people 
for specific crimes as listed in the Criminal Code.39 Dewdney went so far as to 
suggest the code itself be amended to make the prosecution of chiefs easier. No 
modification to the Criminal Code was ever made in this regard.
As Dewdney and Vankoughnet debated how to rid  themselves of  the chiefs, 
the North West Mounted  Police was  growing  increasingly  concerned with  the 
policies of the Department of Indian Affairs. Throughout 1884, police inspectors 
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Rebellion and the End of the Treaty Movement
On April 2, 1885, Big Bear’s attempts at negotiating new treaties with the federal 
government came to a quick and violent end. Shortly after the Métis victory at 
Duck Lake,  and while Big Bear was  absence  from his  camp,  several warriors 
from his band and the neighbouring Wood Cree band attacked the settlement of 
Frog Lake,  looting  the Hudson’s Bay Company  store  and  killing  nine  people, 
including  the  Indian  agent, Thomas Quinn;  the  farm  instructor,  John Delaney; 
and  two  Catholic  priests  (Morton  1979,  77).  Bolstered  by  additional  warriors 
from Bobtail’s Reserve and the Cold Lake Chipewyans, the bands moved down 
the  Saskatchewan  River  towards  Fort  Pitt,  where  they  met  Little  Poplar  and 
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to  18 months  after  both  developed  serious  illnesses. Big Bear was  released  in 




Mounted Police and government officials, such as Reed and Dewdney, that the 
uprising would spread to all the bands in the Territories, proved to be unfounded. 






till  death.”41  Piapot,  once  considered  one  of  the more  “troublesome”  chiefs  in 
Treaty 4,  also  referred  to his promise of  loyalty by  stating,  “It  is  eleven years 
since I gave up fighting. When I took the Government Treaty, I touched the pen 
not to interfere with the white man and the white man not to interfere with me ... I 
promise you [Macdonald] as I have promised our Governor that I will never fight 
against the white man.”42 All the while promising their loyalty, the chiefs used the 
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saw Big Bear and Poundmaker as the leaders of the Indian rebellion, disregarding 
several eyewitness accounts  to  the contrary. As  leaders of disloyal bands,  they 
were to bear the brunt of the blame.46 As a result of their involvement, the rebel-
lious bands were considered  to have violated  the  treaties  they had  signed,  and 







ment of Indian Affairs’s position towards complaints. In the first years after the 
uprising, any chief that dared complain about missing treaty cattle or not having 
received  his  full  complement  of  implements  was  accused  of  disloyalty.  The 
department  continued  to  keep  a  close watch  on bands,  and  appointed  regional 
officials to tour reserves and report on the level of discontentment among the 
bands. An example of one such tour was the one made by the Anglican bishop of 
the Northwest Territories, J.A. MacKay, to the Battleford bands. While he found 




its general handling of the Aboriginal population in the Northwest and, specifi-
cally,  its  respect  of  the  treaties, was being questioned  in Ottawa. The member 
of Parliament  for Huron-West, Malcolm Cameron, presented a strong criticism 
of the department’s handling of the treaties and the rebellion. Using first-hand 
accounts from prominent figures in the Northwest Territories, such as Father 
Scollen, and the reports of the department itself, Cameron presented the case that 





rest with the department’s officials. 
The conduct of the officials of the North-West Territories, more than any thing else, 
created dissatisfaction and discontent among the Indians; I say that the misconduct and 
the mismanagement of the Administration in connection with the Indian Affairs in the 
North-West Territories,  as much  as  anything  else produced uneasiness,  dissatisfaction 
and discontent among the Indians, which ultimately broke out into open rebellion.49
Cameron also accused the federal government of breaking the promises made in 




This is an excerpt from "Volume 4: Moving Forward, Making a Difference," in the Aboriginal Policy Research Series, © Thompson Educational Publishing, Inc., 2013 





The MP’s  remarks  in  the House  of  Commons were  a  surprisingly  accurate 
representation  of  the  arguments  being  made  by  Treaty  chiefs  in  the  10  years 
following the signing of the treaties. As usual, the Department of Indian Affairs 
responded to Cameron by outlining how the government had endeavoured to fulfil 
the treaties. In a 60-page document, the officials of the department, specifically 
Lawrence Vankoughnet,  refuted every  single claim made  in Cameron’s  speech 
to  the House of Commons. The departmental  report  refuted Cameron’s  claims 




















childish manner. The  report  stated  that  the Treaty  bands  “have  very  imperfect 
notions of the duties of the Government towards them, and of their claims upon 





the bands while  they were  in  a  state of  “simplicity” and “ignorance.” Further-
more, it saw itself as the ultimate arbiter of what was required for their advance-
ment  and what was beyond  their  capabilities  (5). The department’s  rebuttal  of 
Cameron’s  allegations  brought  the matter  to  a  close. While  there  was  a  short 
debate in the Senate regarding Cameron’s presentation later that year, the issue of 
treaties and the fulfilment of treaty obligations never returned to the floor of the 
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In  the  past  130  years,  the  confrontational  positions  of  Treaty  First  Nations 
and  the  federal  government  have  remained  largely  unchanged,  although  the 
conflict was suppressed. First Nations still claim that the treaties have remained 
largely unfulfilled while the Crown’s position is that treaty obligations have been 
respected in accordance to the letter of the text. While Indian and Northern Affairs 
Canada maintains a largely similar position to the one it held back in the late nine-
teenth century, the Treaty First Nations have modified their position. In the 1870s 
and 1880s, treaty leaders continuously remarked that the treaties they had signed 
were not sufficient to allow them to either continue their traditional way of life or 
to adapt to the new agricultural lifestyle being advocated by the department. This 
perception of the insufficiencies of the existing treaties led to a series of calls for 
a renegotiation of the treaties, and attempts to get better terms. 
Today, Treaty First Nations are looking for new agreements that would build 




did not reflect the earlier treaty. The same has happened in Saskatchewan with the 
long-standing self-government negotiations between Canada and the Federation 
of Saskatchewan Indian Nations. In this case, Grand Chief Alphonse Bird linked 
the rejection of the final agreement at the referendum level to the failure to see 
any clear references to the Numbered Treaties. As self-government and compre-
hensive land claim negotiations continue, the respect accorded to the Numbered 
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